Dirty Bombs Revisited: Combating the Hype by Stratfor

By Scott Stewart

As STRATFOR has noted for several years now, media coverage of the threat posed by dirty bombs runs in a perceptible cycle with distinct spikes and lulls. We are currently in one of the periods of heightened awareness and media coverage. A number of factors appear to have sparked the current interest, including the recently concluded Nuclear Security Summit hosted by U.S. President Barack Obama. Other factors include the resurfacing rumors that al Qaeda militant Adnan El Shukrijumah may have returned to the United States and is planning to conduct an attack, as well as recent statements by members of the Obama administration regarding the threat of jihadist militants using weapons of mass destruction (WMD). A recent incident in India in which a number of people were sickened by radioactive metal at a scrap yard in a New Delhi slum also has received a great deal of media coverage. 

In spite of the fact that dirty bombs have been discussed widely in the press for many years now -- especially since the highly publicized arrest of Jose Padilla in May 2002 -- much misinformation and disinformation continues to circulate regarding dirty bombs. The misinformation stems from long-held misconceptions and ignorance, while the disinformation comes from scaremongers hyping the threat for financial or political reasons. Frankly, many people have made a lot of money by promoting fear since 9/11. 

Just last week, we read a newspaper article in which a purported expert interviewed by the reporter discussed how a dirty bomb would "immediately cause hundreds or even thousands of deaths." This is simply not true. A number of radiological accidents have demonstrated that a dirty bomb will not cause this type of death toll. Indeed, the panic generated by a dirty bomb attack could very well result in more immediate deaths than the detonation of the device itself. Unfortunately, media stories hyping the threat of these devices may foster such panic, thus increasing the death toll. To counter this irrational fear, we feel it is time once again to discuss dirty bombs in detail and provide our readers with a realistic assessment of the threat they pose. 

Dirty Bombs Defined

A dirty bomb is a type of radiological dispersal device (RDD), and RDDs are, as the name implies, devices that disperse a radiological isotope. Depending on the motives of those planning the attack, an RDD could be a low-key weapon that surreptitiously releases aerosolized radioactive material, dumps out a finely powdered radioactive material or dissolves a radioactive material in water. Such surreptitious dispersal methods would be intended to slowly expose as many people as possible to the radiation and to prolong their exposure. Unless large amounts of a very strong radioactive material are used, however, the effects of such an exposure will be limited. People are commonly exposed to heightened levels of radiation during activities such as air travel and mountain climbing. To cause adverse effects, radiation exposure must occur either in a very high dose over a short period or in smaller doses sustained over a longer period. This is not to say that radiation is not dangerous, but rather the idea that the slightest amount of exposure to radiation causes measurable harm is not accurate. 

By its very nature, the RDD is contradictory. Maximizing the harmful effects of radiation involves maximizing the exposure of the victims to the highest possible concentration of a radioisotope. When dispersing the radioisotope, by definition and design the RDD dilutes the concentration of the radiation source, spreading smaller amounts of radiation over a larger area. Additionally, the use of an explosion to disperse the radioisotope alerts the intended victims, who can then evacuate the affected area and be decontaminated. These factors make it very difficult for an attacker to administer a deadly dose of radiation via a dirty bomb. 

It is important to note that a dirty bomb is not a nuclear device, and no nuclear reaction occurs. A dirty bomb will not produce an effect like the nuclear devices dropped on Hiroshima or Nagasaki. A dirty bomb is quite simply an RDD that uses explosives as the means to disperse a radioactive isotope, and the only blast effect will be from the explosives used to disperse the radioisotope. In a dirty bomb attack, radioactive material not only is dispersed, but the dispersal is accomplished in an obvious manner, and the explosion immediately alerts the victims and authorities that an attack has taken place. The attackers hope that notice of their attack will cause mass panic -- in other words, the RDD is a weapon of fear and terror. 

The radioisotopes that can be used to construct an RDD are fairly common. Even those materials considered by many to be the most likely to be used in an RDD, such as cobalt-60 and cesium-137, have legitimate medical, commercial and industrial uses. Organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency warn that such radioisotopes are readily available to virtually any country in the world, and they are almost certainly not beyond the reach of even moderately capable non-state actors. Indeed, given the ease of obtaining radiological isotopes and the ease with which a dirty bomb can be constructed, we are surprised that we have not seen one successfully used in a terror attack. We continue to believe that it is only a matter of time before a dirty bomb is effectively employed somewhere. Because of this, let's examine what effectively employing a dirty bomb means. 

Dirty Bomb Effectiveness

Like a nonexplosive RDD, unless a dirty bomb contains a large amount of very strong radioactive material, the effects of the device are not likely to be immediate and dramatic. In fact, the explosive effect of the RDD is likely to kill more people than the device's radiological effect. This need for a large quantity of a radioisotope not only creates the challenge of obtaining that much radioactive material, it also means that such a device would be large and unwieldy -- and therefore difficult to smuggle into a target such as a subway or stadium.

In practical terms, a dirty bomb can produce a wide range of effects depending on the size of the improvised explosive device (IED) and the amount and type of radioactive material involved. (Powdered radioisotopes are easier to disperse than materials in solid form.) Environmental factors such as terrain, weather conditions and population density would also play an important role in determining the effects of such a device. 

Significantly, while the radiological effects of a dirty bomb may not be instantly lethal, the radiological impact of an RDD will in all likelihood affect an area larger than the killing radius of the IED itself, and will persist for far longer. The explosion from a conventional IED is over in an instant, but radiation released by a RDD can persist for decades unless the area is decontaminated. While the radiation level may not be strong enough to affect people exposed briefly in the initial explosion, the radiation will persist in the contaminated area, and the cumulative effects of such radiation could prove very hazardous. (Here again, the area contaminated and the ease of decontamination will depend on the type and quantity of the radioactive material used. Materials in a fine powdered form are easier to disperse and harder to clean up than solid blocks of material.) In either case, it will be necessary to evacuate people from the contaminated area, and people will need to stay out of the area until it can be decontaminated, a process that could prove lengthy and expensive. 

Therefore, while a dirty bomb is not truly a WMD like a nuclear device, we frequently refer to them as "weapons of mass disruption" or "weapons of mass dislocation" because they may temporarily render contaminated areas uninhabitable. The expense of decontaminating a large, densely populated area, such as a section of London or Washington, is potentially quite high. This cost would also make a dirty bomb a type of economic weapon.

Historical Precedents

The world has not yet witnessed a successful dirty bomb attack by a terrorist or militant group. That does not necessarily mean that militant groups have not been interested in radiological weapons, however. Chechen militants have perhaps been the most active in the realm of radioactive materials. In November 1995, Chechen militants under the command of Shamil Basayev placed a small quantity of cesium-137 in Moscow's Izmailovsky Park. Rather than disperse the material, however, the Chechens used the material as a psychological weapon by directing a TV news crew to the location and thus creating a media storm and fostering public fear. The material in this incident was thought to have been obtained from a nuclear waste or isotope storage facility in the Chechen capital of Grozny. 

In December 1998, the pro-Russian Chechen Security Service announced it had found a dirty bomb consisting of a land mine combined with radioactive materials next to a railway line frequently used to transport Russian troops. It is believed that Chechen militants planted the device. In September 1999, two Chechen militants who attempted to steal highly radioactive materials from a chemical plant in Grozny were incapacitated after carrying the container for only a few minutes each; one reportedly died. This highlights another difficulty with producing a really effective dirty bomb: The strongest radioactive material is dangerous to handle, and even a suicide operative might not be able to move and employ it before being overtaken by its effects. 

Still, none of these Chechen incidents really provided a very good example of what a dirty bomb detonation would actually look like. To do this, we need to look at incidents where radiological isotopes were dispersed by accident. In 1987, in Goiania, Brazil, a tiny radiotherapy capsule of cesium chloride salt was accidentally broken open after being salvaged from a radiation therapy machine left at an abandoned health care facility. Over the course of 15 days, the capsule containing the radioisotope was handled by a number of people who were fascinated by the faint blue glow it gave off. Some victims reportedly even smeared the substance on their bodies. The radiation was then dispersed by these people to various parts of the surrounding neighborhood, and some of it was even taken to nearby towns. In all, more than 1,000 people were contaminated during the incident and some 244 were found to have significant radioactive material in or on their bodies. Still, only four people died from the incident, and most of those who died had sustained exposure to the contamination. In addition to the human toll, the cleanup operation in Goiania cost more than $100 million, as many houses had to be razed and substantial quantities of contaminated soil had to be removed from the area.

In a more recent case involving a scrap dealer, this time in a slum outside New Delhi, India, eight people were admitted to the hospital because of radiation exposure after a scrap dealer dismantled an object containing cobalt-60. The material apparently arrived at a scrap shop March 12, and the owner of the shop was admitted to the hospital April 4 suffering from radiation-poisoning symptoms (again another case involving prolonged exposure to a radiation source). The radiation source was found at the scrap yard April 5 and identified as cobalt-60. Indian authorities hauled away eight piles of contaminated scrap. The cleanup operation was easier in the Indian incident, since the radioactive material was in metallic form and found in larger pieces rather than in powdered form seen in the cesium in Goiania. Intriguingly, a nearby scrap shop also was found to be contaminated April 16, but it appears from initial reports that the second site was contaminated by a second radioactive source that contained a weaker form of cobalt-60. Though we are watching for additional details on this case, so far, despite the long-term exposure to a potent radioactive source, no deaths have been reported. 

At the other end of the spectrum from the Goiania and New Delhi accidents is the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear disaster in northern Ukraine, when a 1-gigawatt power reactor exploded. It is estimated that more than one hundred times the radiation of the Hiroshima bomb was released during the accident -- the equivalent of 50 million to 250 million grams of radium. More than 40 different radioisotopes were released, and there was a measurable rise in cesium-137 levels across the entire European continent. No RDD could ever aspire to anything close to such an effect.

Chernobyl wrought untold suffering, and estimates suggest that it may ultimately contribute to the deaths of 9,000 people. But many of those affected by the radiation are still alive more than 20 years after the accident. While STRATFOR by no means seeks to downplay the tragic human or environmental consequences of this disaster, the incident is instructive when contemplating the potential effects of a dirty bomb attack. In spite of the incredible amounts of radioactive material released at Chernobyl, only 31 people died in the explosion and immediate aftermath. Today, 5.5 million people live in the contaminated zone -- many within or near the specified EU dosage limits for people living near operational nuclear power plants.

It is this type of historical example that causes us to be so skeptical regarding claims that a small dirty bomb will cause hundreds or even thousands of deaths. Instead, the most strategic consequences of this sort of destruction are economic. By some estimates, the Chernobyl disaster will ultimately cost well in excess of $100 billion. Again, in our opinion, a dirty bomb should be considered a weapon of disruption -- one that will cause economic loss, but would not cause mass casualties or any real mass destruction. 

Fighting Panic

Analytically, based upon the ease of manufacture and the historical interest by militants in dirty bombs -- which ironically may in part be due to the way the RDD threat has been hyped -- it is only a matter of time before militants successfully employ one. Since the contamination created by such a device can be long-lasting, more rational international actors probably would prefer to detonate such a device against a target outside their own country. In other words, they would lean toward attacking a target within the United States or United Kingdom rather than the U.S. or British embassies in their home country.

And since it is not likely to produce mass casualties, a dirty bomb attack would likely be directed against a highly symbolic target -- such as one representing the economy or government -- and designed to cause the maximum amount of disruption at the target site. Therefore, it is not out of the question to imagine such an attack aimed at a target such as Wall Street or the Pentagon. The device would not destroy these sites, but would limit access to them for as long as it took to decontaminate them.

As noted above, we believe it is possible that the panic caused by a dirty bomb attack could well kill more people than the device itself. People who understand the capabilities and limitations of dirty bombs are less likely to panic than those who do not, which is the reason for this analysis. Another important way to help avoid panic is to carefully think about such an incident in advance and to put in place a carefully crafted contingency plan for your family and business. Contingency plans are especially important for those who work in proximity to a potential dirty bomb target. But they are useful in any disaster, whether natural or man-made, and something that should be practiced by all families and businesses. Such knowledge and planning provide people with the ability to conduct an orderly and methodical evacuation of the affected area. This allows them to minimize their exposure to radioactivity while also minimizing their risk of injury or death due to mass hysteria. For while a dirty bomb attack could well be messy and disruptive, it does not have to be deadly.

"Dirty Bombs Revisited: Combating the Hype is republished with permission of Stratfor."

CBRN Weapons and Non-State Actors

What type(s) of non-state actors, according to their characteristics and objectives, are most likely to use CBRN weapons? by Amaury Vergely 

Ever since the 1995 sarin attack of the Tokyo Subway by the religious cult Aum Shinrikyo (“Aum Supreme Truth”), there has been a growing fear that non-state actors, especially terrorist groups, might decide to resort to Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear weapons (CBRN) on a large scale. Governments and counter-terrorism agencies have set up measures to minimize the threat, while academics and experts have tried to profile the groups interested in acquiring and using such weapons. First of all, it is important to explain why this paper will deliberately focus on terrorist groups, which are only one sub-category of non-state actors (other groups would include political lobbies, criminal organisations, separatist groups or even single individuals). When it comes to CBRN weapons, this paper argues that any group willing to use them could be defined as a terrorist organisation (but not automatically, insofar as “terrorist” remains a label that does not have a globally shared definition), whatever its personal objectives or characteristics. Indeed, although CBRN weapons can be very different from one another, they share some key aspects that make them all identifiable as “terror weapons” (their ability to provoke mass destruction and generate unprecedented fear among the population, to name a few). The few case studies of previous CBRN incidents have lead experts to identify key characteristics of terrorist groups that would potentially have an interest in CBRN weapons. Most of them agree that apocalyptic or religious extremist groups are the most likely to use CBRN weapons. However, although groups that present such characteristics might be the most dangerous ones regarding the subject matter, I think that the assumptions underlying these conclusions are misleading. To overcome these issues, this paper will attempt to follow the same analytic pattern, identifying shared characteristics of groups that have turned to CBRN terrorism through four case studies. It will then present the conclusions drawn by academics and experts in major research papers and discuss them, stressing the risk of misconceptions regarding CBRN weapons. Finally, this paper will argue that the type of a group is too reductive to determine effectively which group(s) are most likely to use CBRN weapons and is not as crucial as the combination of factors that might lead the group to this decision.

Four different case studies are usually discussed when experts want to determine the characteristics of potential users of CBRN weapons. Three of them are large-scale “successful” CBRN attacks, while the last one is a potential threat that seems to be a major concern for the US government and the international community as a whole. Chronologically, the first successful CBRN attack happened in 1984, when the Rajneeshee religious cult poisoned 751 people, spreading Salmonella typhimurium bacteria over ten salad bars. No fatality was reported. The aim of the attack was to influence a local vote in Oregon by limiting the voter turnout. Another deadly agent, Salmonella typhi, had been suggested to the leader of the group, Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh, but he reportedly refused, claiming that the attack was aiming at incapacitating people, not killing them. The second case occurred in 1990 in Sri Lanka. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), a separatist militant organisation active in the north of the country, assaulted a military facility using chlorine gas. At least 60 soldiers got sick due to gas exposure, although no fatality was reported. The operation was a success, despite that members of the LTTE got exposed to chlorine when the wind shifted. The third case, previously mentioned, was the 1995 release of sarin gas in the Tokyo subway by the religious cult Aum Shinrikyo. The attack killed 12 people and injured 200, while up to 5,000 stormed in hospitals believing they had been exposed. Finally, the last case study is Al Qaeda’s reported attempt to acquire and intention to use a CBRN weapon. Extensive evidence can be found to support this statement: the declaration of bin Laden in 1998 that acquiring CBRN weapons ‘is a religious duty’ (remaining very vague regarding its actual possession of such weapons), the 2003 fatwa (a religious decree) condoning the killing of 4 Million of Americans, described as a legitimate act of vengeance, as well as numerous documents found in Afghanistan attesting of active researches and experiments in CBRN weapons. A whole volume of Al Qaeda’s “Encyclopaedia of Jihad” even details the construction of Chemical and Biological weapons. Although it is not clear whether Al Qaeda remains at an early stage of development of CBRN weapons, there is no doubt regarding the organisation’s interest in such weapons.

Even though these case studies differ by many more aspects than they resemble each other, they share a few common points. In all four cases, a charismatic leader was involved: Prabakaran, leader of the LTTE, controlled the entire life of his followers up to their diet, bin Laden required that Al Qaeda’s members swore allegiance to him (bay’ah), while Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh and Shoko Asahara were the spiritual leaders of their cult. In the case of Asahara, he had a huge influence over his followers, predicting the end of the world and promising salvation to all members of Aum. Indeed, a charismatic leader is an important factor for a group that would turn to CBRN terrorism: the influence of the leader can be so important that his decisions are enough to suppress any moral constraint that a member would have, because he holds the truth and the justification of all the actions carried out by the group. Moreover, he is the only one bearing responsibility for them, the individual fading away in the group as a whole. An analogue argument regarding a divine justification of religious groups’ actions is also often put forward. In two cases, members of the group had a personal interest or obsession with CBRN weapons: Ma Anand Puja, the member of the Rajneeshees who suggested the use of Salmonella typhi, was suspected of being a ‘serial poisoner’, while Aum Shinrikyo had a very hierarchical organisation with scientists as head of chemical and biological departments, not to mention Asahara personal fascination with unconventional weapons. He even wrote a song about sarin, titled ‘Song of Sarin, the Magician’. Social alienation also played an important role in the Aum and Rajneeshee cults: after losing the 1990 elections, Aum decided that no one from outside of the group could be saved, drawing a clear line between “us” and “them”, while the Rajneeshees were living in a small community in Waso County, isolated from anyone else. The consequence of this alienation was that any exterior social constraint regarding violence would have no impact on the group’s decisions. Finally, religion was a factor in three of these cases, or at least a major characteristic of the groups involved.

But that is as far as this comparison goes. The use of CBRN weapons was a rational choice that addressed very different needs and objectives in each case. While it played a central role in Aum’s prophesised apocalypse (although the 1995 sarin attack was a desperate action triggered by a planned operation of the Japanese police to close in on the group’s facilities), the LTTE only resorted to chemical weapons that one time because of a shortage of conventional weapons and has never used chlorine again. While Al Qaeda might be willing to use CBRN weapons for their psychological and symbolic impact, which requires visibility, the Rajneeshees’ attack went unnoticed for over a year. According to John Parachini, Director of the Intelligence Policy Center at the RAND Corporation, the role of religion has been played up, even in the cases of Aum and Al Qaeda. Asahara had an egocentric personality and wanted to be the emperor of the post-Armageddon world, one of the few to actually survive the end of the world. Bin Laden’s divine justification of a holy war can be regarded as a personal vanguard against the United States and its allies. The Rajneeshee was a religious cult but had a secular objective (winning a local election). Therefore, it seems that a simple profile of a group willing to use CBRN weapons cannot be deducted from these case studies only.

The literature on the subject reveals two different trends: one that mostly expends on the case studies mentioned above as well as minor CBRN incidents, using a qualitative approach to establish a typology of groups most likely susceptible to resort to CBRN weapons, and a second one using a quantitative approach, exploiting the CBRN terrorism database of the Monterey Institute of International Studies. It is worth noticing that the findings of both the approaches differ at some point. Regarding the qualitative approach, the different typologies are very similar in their content. I present here Drs. Charles Ferguson and Wiliam Potter’s typology of terrorist groups according to their potential interest in nuclear terrorism, but it differs very little from Professor Robin Frost’s. Ferguson and Potter focus their study on four types of groups: ‘apocalyptic groups’, ‘politico-religious groups’, ‘nationalist/separatist groups’ and ‘single-issue terrorists’. According to them, apocalyptic groups pose the greatest threat when it comes to nuclear terrorism, because some of them might want to bring about the Apocalypse they foresee, in which case the means becomes the end itself. The key characteristics of such groups are ‘charismatic leaders, isolation and alienation from the larger society, sense of paranoia and grandiosity’. It is obvious that this category refers directly to Aum Shinrikyo, which is nonetheless a very specific religious cult that cannot be compared to any other existing terrorist group.

The second category they mention is ‘politico-religious groups’, cause and offspring of the 9/11 attacks. They call such groups ‘hybrids’ as an answer to those who claim that Al Qaeda’s objectives are not only religious, but also political (creation of a global caliphate, but also pushing the United States out of the Middle East). Ferguson and Potter contend that nuclear weapons might appeal to such groups, using the example of Al Qaeda that is willing to inflict mass casualties to the West. Whether the group would actually use a nuclear weapon if it managed to acquire one is not discussed by the authors, but that is a debatable point to which we will come back later.  Interestingly, Frost puts apocalyptic groups and politico-religious groups into one single category, ‘religious terrorism’, that encompasses altogether the Rajneeshee, Aum Shinrikyo and Al Qaeda. He insists on the threat posed by a divine justification of an act presented as a religious imperative.

The third category of Ferguson and Potter’s typology, nationalist/separatist groups, also appears in Frost’s typology. The authors all agree on the disincentives such groups might be confronted with when it comes to using nuclear weapons. These groups, like the Irish Republican Army or Chechen rebels to name a few, are depending on their base constituency’s support and therefore cannot risk to alienate them by undertaking actions that they would not approve of. It was the case for the Real IRA, an offshoot of the IRA responsible for the bombing of a shopping centre in Omagh, Northern Ireland, which lost the support of the population after this operation, leading to its dismantlement. These groups present themselves as “freedom fighters” in order to gain international support and claim to merely target military and governmental installations, although Frost mentions that their rhetoric does not deceive anyone: out of 1,800 victims of the IRA between 1969 and 1994, 600 were civilians. Using a nuclear weapon would be counterproductive according to their strategy, although Ferguson and Potter claim that they ‘might benefit from appearing to have the capability’, an argument that they oppose themselves, mentioning the radicalisation of the government’s stance every time Chechens have mentioned resorting to CBRN weapons. Finally, being geographically focused, they would risk a massive retaliation from the country they would attack, potentially leading to their annihilation.

The last category of Ferguson and Potter are single-issue terrorists (eco-terrorists, anti-nuclear activists, animal liberationists, anti-abortionists, etc…). According to them, these groups do not represent a threat insofar as they have very targeted goals that do not include mass casualties. In this category, Frost mentions an exception: ‘green anarchists’, terrorists who advocate a rebirth of the earth through the annihilation of the human race. This sub-category presents similarities with apocalyptic groups and might very well be willing to use a nuclear weapon to achieve its end, with very little moral constraint whatsoever. Frost also adds ‘social-revolutionary’ and ‘right-wing’ groups in his typology, but argues that nuclear weapons would probably not appeal to them, as they present similarities with nationalist/separatist groups.

Other qualitative studies have also addressed the typology of groups that would be interested in using biological weapons, which is considered to be the most likely scenario of a CBRN attack by most articles in the literature. According to Francisco Galamas, Islamic extremist groups are the most likely to use biological weapons, because they are set on killing non-believers in an indiscriminate manner. Biological weapons have the potential to kill thousands and could be effectively combined with suicide tactics to provoke mass casualties, such as using a contaminated terrorist to propagate a pathogen in a public area. This argument would however be refuted by Adam Dolnik, who underlines the differences between a suicide bomb attack and a suicide CBRN attack, the latter lacking any of the incentives of the former. According to Galamas’ typology, the second group that is most likely to use a biological weapon are religious cults. The author draws his argument from the examples of the Rajneeshee’s Salmonella poisoning and Aum’s numerous attempts to produce and use Botulinum toxin and anthrax between 1990 and 1993. It is worth noticing that religion remains the primary factor in biological weapons qualitative studies.

The main quantitative studies have been conducted by Kate Ivanova and Todd Sandler in 2006 and 2007, using data of hundreds of CBRN attacks indexed on the Monterey Institute’s CBRN terrorism database from 1988 to 2004. Their findings indicate that democracy, past CBRN incidents, corruption and transnationalism increase the risks of a CBRN attack. However, Ivanova and Sandler have also found that ‘religious fundamentalists and nationalists/separatists do not present (…) a CBRN concern’. According to them, non-religious groups are five times more likely to use CBRN weapons than religious groups. However, these results are not entirely at odds with qualitative studies, because Ivanova and Sandler found that religious groups that are also transnational – such as Al Qaeda – were the most likely to use CBRN weapons.  Nevertheless, it would seem that the factor “transnational” is of the uttermost importance and that religion alone does not support the use of a CBRN weapon.

All these studies attempt to profile groups that would be interested in using CBRN weapons. However, some of the assumptions they base their arguments on can be misleading. I will discuss three points that are often overlooked in the literature. First of all, I do not think like Frost that ‘the decision to “go nuclear” would necessarily involve the intention to do so’. For example, in my opinion, Al Qaeda would probably benefit more from pretending to have a CBRN weapon than using one. The group is not insensitive to its followers’ opinion, otherwise the organisation would not have felt the need to justify the killings of 9/11. However, claiming to “potentially” have a CBRN weapon is a cost free psychological weapon in itself. Therefore, whether Al Qaeda would actually use a CBRN weapon is debatable. Another misconception is that CBRN weapons are necessarily weapons of mass destruction, and that terrorists would automatically use them to kill a lot of people and carry out an attack more spectacular than 9/11. Given its psychological impact, a CBRN attack does not need to make mass casualties to reach what Ivanova and Sandler call the ‘media bar’ of 9/11. Moreover, to date, conventional attacks have proven far more lethal than CBRN attacks. Therefore, it appears that the “mass casualty” factor is not necessarily fundamental to explain the choice of a group to use a CBRN weapon.

This paper has attempted to show that the traditional approach consisting in determining the type of non-state actors most likely to use CBRN weapons through typologies and case studies might lead to false conclusions, when trying to fit all groups in one single model. CBRN weapons are very different from each other, and the motives explaining why one group would choose to develop and use one particular agent depends on its own objectives and characteristics. While these characteristics can be shared with other groups, they are not self-sufficient. Therefore, this paper argues that a correct approach to the issue would be to think of it as a threshold depending on a combination of all the characteristics mentioned above. Religion is not enough to resort to CBRN weapons, but if a religious group is also transnational, apocalyptic and lead by a charismatic figure, it becomes much more likely to use a CBRN weapon. This proposition would also explain why the Aum Shinrikyo case, symbol of CBRN terrorism, is unique and unlikely to be replicated: many positive factors have simultaneously converged to one very specific group.

Source: http://theriskyshift.com/2013/05/cbrn-weapons-and-non-state-actors/#ixzz2kQaNqIQV

Zostać rentierem

Wynajem nieruchomości może być wciągającym i dochodowym biznesem. Zwłaszcza jeśli jest to najem krótkoterminowy. Jak wygląda ten coraz bardziej popularny biznes od środka?

Centrum stolicy. Z okien klimatyzowanego apartamentu na 20. piętrze wieżowca rozciąga się panorama Warszawy. Najlepiej ogląda się ją, siedząc na stylowej kanapie z kieliszkiem białego wina w ręku. Na stoliku kawowym czekają bilety na premierę nowego spektaklu. Skoro tak może wyglądać scenariusz biznesowej wizyty w Warszawie, dlaczego nie wybrać go zamiast noclegu w sieciowym hotelu?

Wynajem apartamentów stał się ostatnio popularną alternatywą dla tych, którzy nie lubią anonimowości hoteli, ale cenią sobie wysoki standard pokoi. Są skłonni zapłacić sporo, bo takie lokum zapewnia większą prywatność, dostęp do własnej kuchni, a zdarza się, że właściciele oferują też dodatkowe usługi, jak drobne zakupy czy rezerwacje biletów.

Ale nie trzeba oferować luksusów, by znaleźć chętnych na wynajem na krótki okres. Rodziny podróżujące z dziećmi i grupy znajomych chętnie wynajmują całe mieszkania, bo przy większej grupie jest to bardzo opłacalne. W Warszawie noc w apartamencie dla dwóch osób kosztuje 150–240 zł, trzypokojowe mieszkanie dla sześciu osób to koszt ok. 350 złotych za noc. Chętnych jest coraz więcej także dzięki serwisom społecznościowym jak Wimdu czy Airbnb, które popularyzują najem pokoi i mieszkań zamiast miejsc noclegowych w hostelach.

Mając zatem do dyspozycji wolne mieszkanie, warto zastanowić się, czy najem krótkoterminowy nie jest bardziej opłacalny od wynajmu na długi okres. Są tacy, którzy uczynili z tego prężny biznes. Tak jak każdy ma on jednak swoje cienie, a i konkurencja na rynku jest już niemała.

Euro 2012 – złote czasy dla wynajmu

Sylwia Pochelska ma 28 lat. Od trzech utrzymuje się z wynajmu apartamentów. Obecnie jej firma Mieszkanie na Zawołanie ma ich w ofercie sześć, a wkrótce dojdą dwa. Żadne nie jest jej własnością – wynajmuje je od osób, które wolą podpisać długoterminową umowę i mieć święty spokój. Zachęcona sukcesami w lutym otworzyła hostel w centrum Warszawy. W tym celu wynajęła 200-metrowe mieszkanie w starej kamienicy, które starannie wyremontowała. Czy odniesie sukces? Za wcześnie, by to oceniać, bo sezon wakacyjny dopiero się rozpoczął, ale Sylwia jest dobrej myśli.

Przygodę ze stołecznym rynkiem nieruchomości zaczęła jeszcze jako studentka od jednego mieszkania, które udostępniono jej na kilka miesięcy w zamian za odświeżenie wnętrz. Remont przeprowadziła za pieniądze z dotacji unijnej dla młodych przedsiębiorców. Z czasem do oferty dołączała kolejne lokale, które wyposażała już za własne pieniądze. W czasie rozgrywek Euro 2012 miała do dyspozycji aż 15 mieszkań w Warszawie i cztery we Wrocławiu.

– Okres piłkarskich mistrzostw Europy to było prawdziwe szaleństwo. Ceny dwukrotnie wyższe niż normalnie, a zainteresowanie ogromne – wspomina. – Zaraz potem rynek się jednak gwałtownie skurczył i wiele firm, które powstały w tym czasie, dziś już nie istnieje.

Podobne obserwacje ma Piotr Iwaniuk, właściciel PiotrApartments.pl, w branży wynajmu krótkoterminowego od trzech lat. Na rynek nieruchomości uciekł z etatu w sektorze bankowym. Za oszczędności i kredyty kupił cztery małe mieszkania, które wykończył w wysokim standardzie. Choć na etacie nie narzekał na wynagrodzenie, dopiero jako przedsiębiorca poczuł wiatr w żaglach.

– Wcześniej pracowałem osiem godzin dziennie. Dziś pracuję także osiem, ale tygodniowo. I zarabiam tyle samo – przyznaje Piotr Iwaniuk.

Od czasu do czasu zatrudnia do pomocy jedną osobę, ale większość spraw, np. porządki w mieszkaniach czy przekazywanie kluczy, załatwia sam. W zależności od pory roku, bo wynajem nieruchomości to biznes sezonowy, na czy­sto zostaje mu nawet kilka tysięcy.

Piotr utrzymuje obłożenie w apartamentach na poziomie 80 procent. W porównaniu z innymi firmami to bardzo dużo. Jak mu się to udaje? Dzięki rosnącej grupie stałych klientów, głównie biznesmenów, których ku­si zniżkami. Ceni sobie długofalowe relacje, bo znając swoich gości, nie musi się martwić o ewentualne zniszczenia i skargi sąsiadów. Mniej więcej jedna czwarta jego klientów pochodzi z serwisu Wimdu, rzadziej z Airbnb.

Sylwii Pochelskiej udaje się utrzymać obłożenie w swoich mieszkaniach w granicach 60–70 procent. Wylicza, że z każdego ma po odliczeniu kosztów około tysiąca złotych miesięcznie. Z tego trzeba odliczyć ok. 1,5–2 tys. rocznie na drobne naprawy i doposażanie lokali.

Jak sama przyznaje, finansowo bywało lepiej. Od roku przyjeżdża do niej coraz mniej rodzin, które kryzys zmusił do oszczędności. Sytuację ratują rodziny polonijne, które spędzają w Polsce nawet po kilka tygodni.

Inwestowanie w przyszłość

Nieco inaczej wygląda sytuacja Jana Szumowskiego, który ze wspólnikiem, Dariuszem Olszewskim, od pięciu lat prowadzi firmę Apartment4You. Na rynku apartamentów są znaczącymi graczami – oferują w sumie 75 mieszkań: 55 w Warszawie i 20 w Poznaniu.

Zatrudniają ponad 20 osób; do sprzątania, do prac biurowych, obsługi telefonicznej, drobnych napraw. Szacują, że pełne obłożenie mają przez 6–7 miesięcy w roku. Z serwisów społecznościowych nie korzystają, bo przy takiej skali są one kłopotliwe w obsłudze. Ale Szumowski przyznaje, że samo ich pojawienie się zwiększyło obroty o 3–5 procent.

Obaj weszli na rynek wynajmu z doświadczeniem w zupełnie innych branżach. Jan Szumowski pracował w marketingu i reklamie, Dariusz Olszewski – w finansach. Startowali z niedużą pulą własnych lokali. Około połowy z nich jest ich własnością. Podnosząc standard, w zakupach posiłkowali się kredytami. W każdy lokal zainwestowali ok. 1,5 tys. złotych na metr kwadratowy.

– Jako firma nie dostaliśmy kredytu na dobrych warunkach, zatem rentowność tych mieszkań nie jest bardzo wysoka – przyznaje Jan Szumowski. – Ale przecież nie chodzi o to, by odkładać zarobione pieniądze na kupkę, tylko by inwestować w przyszłość. Na przykład w przyszłość moich dzieci.

Spłacanie kredytów nie spędza mu snu z powiek, bo pożyczki zostały wzięte pod hipotekę.

Piotr Iwaniuk, który też spłaca kredyty, radzi, by pamiętać o sezonowości biznesu i mieć odłożone pieniądze na czas, kiedy rynek przeżywa okres zastoju.

– Najlepszy okres to miesiące od września do października, a potem wiosna – od kwietnia do czerwca. Wbrew pozorom latem nie ma aż tak wielu zainteresowanych, bo zamiast do miasta ludzie wolą pojechać nad morze czy do lasu. Nie ma w tym czasie także wielu konferencji, które zapewniają mi klientów – tłumaczy.

– Wrzesień, październik rzeczywiście są świetne. Grudzień jest za to fatalny. W ogóle miesiące świąteczne nie są najlepsze – potwierdza Jan Szumowski.

Sezonowość jest jeszcze bardziej widoczna w mieście targów – w Poznaniu.

– W tygodniach targowych mamy stuprocentowe obłożenie. Ale gdyby nie targi, utrzymywanie mieszkań w Poznaniu byłoby dla nas nieopłacalne – przyznaje współwłaściciel Apartment4You.

Życie rentiera nie jest wolne od stresów

Na rynku najmu długoterminowego można rozważnie dobrać najemcę, a przed stratami zabezpieczyć się choćby wysoką kaucją i odpowiednimi zapisami w umowie. W przypadku najmu krótkoterminowego wpływ na to, kto wynajmuje lokal, jest znacznie mniejszy, a żądanie kaucji nie jest powszechne.

– Inne firmy nie żądają na wejściu kaucji, więc gdybym ją wprowadziła, byłabym po prostu niekonkurencyjna – przyznaje Sylwia Pochelska. – Parę razy się na tym przejechałam. Jeden z gości gasił papierosy na parapecie, ramie lustra, kanapie... Wszędzie zostały po nim wypalone dziury.

Znacznie gorsze doświadczenia ma założyciel Apartment4You. Zniszczenia i kradzieże w mieszkaniach to dla niego chleb powszedni, więc w biznesplanie ma wkalkulowane, że 10–15 proc. przychodu za mieszkanie trzeba reinwestować w skradzione sprzęty i drobne prace remontowe. Ale nigdy nie zapomni dnia, kiedy do jednego z jego lokali musiał się wdzierać oddział antyterrorystów.

– W mieszkaniu urządzono głośną imprezę. Sąsiedzi trzykrotnie wzywali policję, która próbując dostać się do mieszkania, zorientowała się, że przebywają tam kryminaliści. Przyjechała grupa antyterrorystów, wyłamali drzwi, użyli nawet gazu łzawiącego. Panów wyprowadzano w kajdankach – wspomina.

Dziś Jan Szumowski uważa, że lata doświadczenia nauczyły go pewnego wyczucia. – Kiedy widzimy kogoś, kto ewidentnie przyjechał balować, pobieramy pewną kwotę na poczet ewentualnych zniszczeń – mówi.

Jak zatem wygląda rentowność tego typu biznesu? Wszyscy podkreślają, że krótki termin nie opłaca się przy jednym, dwóch  mieszkaniach, bo zachodu jest sporo, a dochody nie większe niż przy długofalowej umowie. Sensowne zarobki zaczynają się wtedy, kiedy pod opieką wynajmującego znajdzie się co najmniej 4–5 apartamentów. Wtedy częste wizyty w mieszkaniu i czas poświęcony na poszukiwanie klientów są wynagradzane wynikami finansowymi.

Według Sylwi Pochelskiej przy 10 mieszkaniach różnica w zarobkach wcale nie jest proporcjonalna, ponieważ na tym etapie trzeba już opłacić osoby do pomocy, a to pożera sporą część dochodu. Dopiero przy 15 lokalach zaczyna na dobre działać efekt skali.

Zrodlo: http://pierwszymilion.forbes.pl/zarabianie-na-wynajmie-mieszkan-zostac-rentierem,artykuly,158294,1,3.html